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Abstract 
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is one of the approaches of risk based decision making. HAZOP will be useful as a 
preliminary study to investigate the risk based decision making of mooring systems. Mooring system is a vital component for the 
safety of floating structures. Floating structures use mooring system for station keeping in any water depths. The result of this study 
will explain the potential causes and the possible consequences of mooring system failures using HAZOP as preliminary analysis. 
©2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a qualitative method with a systematic and structured assessment of a planned or 
operation in order to define and assess the issues which can cause risks to human resources or equipment1.  The 
objectives of a HAZOP study are as follows2: 
- To determine and deal with hazards and design insufficiency for the purpose of ensuring safety and health of 
effective operations. 
- To assess the performance that will satisfy SHE (Safety Health and Environment) standards. 
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 Table 1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of HAZOP 
Methods Advantages Disadvantages References 
HAZOP ¾ Systematic and rigorous 
¾ Involves interaction of views from 
multidisciplinary experts 
¾ Can be applied to a wide range of types of system 
¾ Creates a detailed and auditable record of the 
hazards identification process 
¾ Requires a 
considerable 
amount of 
preparation 
¾ Time consuming 
(Maragakis et 
al, 2009)3 
 
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) useful to identify hazards as a preliminary risk analysis in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner. The problems of interest are analyzed in an attempt to determine the potential causes and their 
consequence able to bring serious damage. The problem is investigated based on the main component of the system. 
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the hazard of mooring system failure include their potential causes of failure, 
the consequences and the safeguard action. The investigation contains a review of each system operation, determining 
each of the potential causes of system failure, their consequences and how to handle it daily. This paper used mobile 
mooring system of semi submersible pipe laying barge as a case study. The HAZOP result is shown in Table 3 which 
is gathered from the brainstorming with the mooring engineer.  
The HAZOP results are qualitative risk assessment based on the experience and knowledge of the experts 
involved in the mooring system. It is as a preliminary study to identify the potential causes of mooring system and 
their consequence. The importance of performing HAZOP analysis as discussed by4 are as the following: 
- HAZOP defines possible hazards, failure and operational issues. 
- HAZOP has been used for over 40 years by professional institutions and legislators.  
- HAZOP methods are used by the majority companies handling and processing hazardous material especially 
oil and gas production, flammable and toxic chemicals and pharmaceuticals etc.  
- HAZOP results are integral elements of plant and safety records and also appropriate to plant modifications.  
The HAZOP need brainstorming with the expert in order to enlighten the method to identify and discuss which 
hazards or operational issues in the mooring system might occur. HAZOP is a preliminary risk analysis study to 
investigate the problems related to mooring system. Expert opinion survey and direct interview with many people 
during offshore seminars, offshore exhibition and workshops that include consultant, supplier, engineers, managers 
involved in mooring system are conducted in order to get an idea and shaping the idea of the common issues and 
problems related to mooring system failure. The result of the interview with the people in seminars and offshore 
exhibitions are combined with the feedback from nine experts are summarized in HAZOP record tabulated in Table 
3.   
The first task to develop HAZOP analysis is through brainstorming session with the people involved in the system. 
The brainstorming session is involving nine experts that balance in terms of experience, knowledge and disciplines. 
The HAZOP teams generally consist of four to eight people to achieve comprehensive results5. For this study, those 
nine experts remain to be the main respondents. All of the experts are recognized professionals in the mooring system 
with experience more than 10 years, therefore their combined knowledge and experience are sufficient to develop the 
framework of risk assessment of the mooring system. These numbers are kept to ensure the maximum quality and 
effectiveness during the brainstorming session6.  The HAZOP study is developed through the following procedure: 
(i) The experts outline the specific objective of the vessel under study and describe the general arrangements 
of the mooring systems. This procedure contains the design arrangement, operational procedure, weather 
condition specification, description of equipment and system descriptions.  
(ii) Any related questions to the scope and concept of the system are discussed.  
(iii) The main components of mooring system consisting of mooring line, anchor failure, anchor handling failure 
and appurtenances connection failure are highlighted due to their main contribution in mooring system.  
(iv) Any related issues about these components are then discussed and answered by the experts.  
(v) The specific components are studied from this point using the HAZOP guide words. Every guide word is a 
systematic list of deviation perspectives to describe certain conditions that may lead to operational problems 
and even causes an accident. Then continued to investigate the potential causes and the consequence of an 
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undesired event. When the safeguards are considered inadequate by the experts because of high contribution 
of likelihood and consequences then an action should be taken.   
 
The HAZOP is developed in a systematic method using the guidewords and deviation to consider each component 
of mooring systems, their potential causes of failure, the consequences and the safeguard action. The HAZOP results 
are tabulated in Table 2. The HAZOP result recorded in this study are generally in the operational and maintainable 
categories. Formerly there are no significant records of potential causes that may lead to an accident. Detailed HAZOP 
actions must be reviewed and recorded by the project manager to ensure that all system are fit for purpose. The 
application of HAZOP can be seen in another paper namely HAZOP as one of the risk assessment method6,7. 
2. HAZOP Methods 
HAZOP as preliminary hazard approach is used to identify and define the potential hazards or problems of a 
system that may lead to an accident. The HAZOP result can be implemented as suggestion action to reduce the risk 
and operational matters. The summary of HAZOP Step is described in Fig. 1: 
 
 
Define the System / Activity
Apply all relevant 
combinations 
of guideword and deviations. 
Any hazards or operating 
problems?
Define the Problems of 
Interest for the Analysis
Record consequence and 
causes and suggest action
HAZOP Report
No
Yes
 
Fig. 1. HAZOP Procedure 
 
The few Steps in order to carry out HAZOP are as follows: 
1. Step 1: Define the system/activity 
Identify and examine the system/activity that is going to be analyzed.  
2. Step 2: Define the problems of interest for the analysis 
Define the potential hazards and significant impact on the system by using guideword and deviation 
parameters.  
211 Silvianita et al. /  Procedia Earth and Planetary Science  14 ( 2015 )  208 – 212 
3. Step 3: Record outcome and causes and suggest action 
Analyze the findings that focus on the critical hazards as well as critical operational problems.  
4. Step 4: HAZOP record 
The results of HAZOP are recorded using HAZOP spreadsheets which generally include the guideword, 
deviation, possible causes, outcome, safeguards and suggestion action, etc.  
3. Results and Discussion 
HAZOP analysis tabulate the results into systematic worksheets. The HAZOP worksheet consists of the 
components under study, guideword, deviation, potential causes, possible consequence, safeguard and suggested 
actions in order to minimize the failure. Table 2 shows the HAZOP result of a mobile mooring system.  
In order to implement HAZOP techniques, the brainstorming and discussion with the experts need to be carried 
out and formulated into systematic record7. The HAZOP records generally consist of guide word, deviation, possible 
causes, possible consequences, safeguards and action to be taken as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. HAZOP Worksheet Example 
System Identification 
Activity: Description of System Activity 
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Possible Consequence Safeguard Action 
 
The descriptions for each column of the presented worksheet are: 
a. Guide word: A keyword to create the imagination of a deviation of the system. 
b. Deviation: Description of a system in which the process condition may depart from their design.  
c. Possible Causes: Description of the causes why the deviation could happen that may result in the worst 
possible consequence. 
d. Possible Consequence: Consequence of the occurrence of the failure or the results of the deviation. 
e. Safeguards: A facilities that either prevent the cause or safeguard against the consequence such as regular 
plant inspections. 
f. Action: description of the action that should be taken when the consequence occur. It can remove the cause 
and mitigate or eliminate the consequences. 
4. Conclusion 
Mooring system is an important part of floating platform that may cause serious accident in oil and gas industry. 
The aim of this study to integrate the risk based decision making (RBDM) for mobile mooring system has been 
successfully carried out. The critical hazards of mobile mooring system using HAZOP have been accomplished as 
seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3. HAZOP Result 
System Identification: Semi Submersible Column Stabilized Pipe Lay Barge 
Activity: Moor the vessel in a working pipe lay configuration 
Compon
ent 
Guide 
Word Deviation 
Potential 
Causes 
Possible 
Consequence Safeguard Action 
Mooring 
Line 
Unable to 
control 
the 
movement 
Moorin
g Line 
Breaka
ge 
Corrosion 
¾ Reduced the 
mooring 
capacities 
for example 
the 
moorings 
no longer 
meet their 
allowable 
loads 
¾ Decrease 
the mooring 
line service 
life 
¾ Broken 
wires ropes 
 
¾ Uses heavier zinc coating to 
enhance corrosion protection 
properties 
¾ The larger diameters of wires 
may use heavier zinc coatings 
to enhance the attainable 
design life 
¾ An anti corrosion blocking 
compound should be applied 
during manufacture to increase 
corrosion prevention measure. 
¾ Regular maintenance and 
inspection in order to avoid 
huge damage. 
¾ Conduct visual inspection for 
example pitting inspection in 
order to determine the 
remaining life of the chain. 
¾ Perform corrosion measurement 
using ROV to measure 
corrosion potential 
Abrasion 
Decrease the 
service life of 
mooring 
lines 
Uses braided jacket or sheathed 
spiral strand wire to minimize 
particle ingression that cause 
harmful abrasion of the ropes. 
¾ In situ water inspection  is 
needed to inspect the 
touchdown zone where rocks 
or debris on the sea bed can 
cause mooring line abrasion 
¾ In situ water inspection of wire 
rope using ROV 
Mooring 
line 
clashed 
¾ Operation 
activities 
delayed 
¾ Vessel 
damage 
Uses a mooring failure detector 
that can be attach with mooring 
chain or wire rope inculdes a 
power source which supply 
power to a transmitter to signal 
the failure by acoustic or radio 
frequency means. 
ROV inspection in order to 
identify if the lines are intact and 
or suffer of breakage using 
inclinometers 
Collision 
¾ Operation 
shutdown 
¾ Vessel 
damage 
 
 
 
¾ Checking the ARPA radar 
¾ Checking the day vision 
radar 
¾ Monitored the radar plant as a 
navigational aid and for 
weather surveillance in order 
to detect and to             track 
weather fronts, storm clouds 
¾ Observe the radar with  
antenna arrays to define the 
anchor location match with 
target acquisition 
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